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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Ian

M. Bolstad

He

aggravated DUI.

Of The

Statement

According

appeals from the judgment 0f conviction, challenging his sentence for

also challenges the district court’s restitution order.

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

t0 the Presentence Investigation

conviction for aggravated

DUI as

[O]n July 27, 2018,

Report (“PSI”), the facts underlying Bolstad’s

follows:

[I.S.P. dispatch]

received over ten phone calls 0f citizens

reporting trafﬁc complaint involving a blue Toyota pickup driving at excessive

speeds 0n the shoulder of the roadway as well as general reckless and erratic
driving.

90

(1 -90)

The

location of the trafﬁc complaint calls started eastbound

on

Interstate

near the state line in Washington and continued until eastbound 1-90 near

milepost 11. At approximately 1538 hours, several reports were received that the

Toyota pickup had crashed into another vehicle eastbound on 1-90 just before
11 in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho.

exit

A Post Falls Ofﬁcer and several other witnesses observed the Toyota collide with
another vehicle at a high rate 0f speed.

The

struck vehicle launched into the air

came t0 rest 0n the concrete barrier between the
and the overhead trafﬁc control sign pole. The Subaru sustained severe
The roof 0f the vehicle had t0 be cut off to extricate the two
contact damage.
occupants. Ellen Francis Brown and passenger Joelle Elizabeth Tanguay were both
seriously injured and transported to nearby medical facilities.
across both lanes 0f travel and

barrier

.

The Washington

.

.

State Patrol informed a blue

Toyota pickup was the suspect

vehicle involved in a hit and run crash in Spokane Valley, Washington, that

hour prior. The Toyota struck a semi’s trailer, failed
and continued driving eastbound 0n the shoulder in a reckless manner.
occurred less than

1

to stop

M. Bolstad was contacted standing behind the blue Toyota. He stated he
stopped t0 help out With the crash and the person driving the blue truck was a “big
black guy” and he stole his “red truck.” Bolstad had red glossy eyes, erratic
Ian

movements, inability t0 focus, and the odor 0f an alcoholic beverage was coming
from his person. When he was asked What kind 0f truck he was driving, he said he
didn’t know because it is his friend’s vehicle. When asked what his friend’s name
was, he didn’t respond. Bolstad then said he had a warrant from Washington, and
he stole the red truck he mentioned in Spokane, Washington. He said he was doing
a meth deal with the guy in the blue truck and was chasing him down. When the

blue truck crashed, he stopped to get the meth out of the truck. Bolstad then said

he might have caused the crash and he should have stopped. He said he was the
brother 0f the guy in the blue truck. He admitted to using methamphetamine an

hour before the crash.

While waiting t0 draw blood, Bolstad was talking to other people When there was
nobody else in the room. His conversations made n0 sense, he was sweating
profusely, and he could not remain still with jerky movements.
While medical staff was trying t0 get his Vitals, he became extremely aggressive.
He had to be restrained and eventually was drive stunned With a conductive energy
device. He was bleeding from his mouth and was spitting blood. Approximately
eight people had to try and hold him down including security staff, and medical
staff had to sedate him.

A blood draw obtained and showed positive for methamphetamine.
When

Bolstad was taken t0 the

He

he ingested.

said he

jail,

he was asked What kind

was pleading

the ﬁfth, and he

[0f]

was

drugs or alcohol

in a “drug induced

psychosis.”
(PSI, pp.183-1841 (explanation added).)

According to the

I.S.P. Collision

Reconstruction and

Analysis Report, the truck Bolstad drove was travelling between 90 t0 94 miles per hour
collided With the Subaru occupied

The

results

by the two women.

Joelle

Tanguay suffered the following

include

As summarized by

subarachnoid

a

hemothoraces

bilaterally;

T3

Ellen

Brown and

the presentence

her

daughter,

injuries:

The records from Kootenai Health
t0

it

(PSI, pp.606, 608.)

of Bolstad’s driving were devastating.

investigator, using medical terminology,

When

indicate that Ellen

hemorrhage;

Brown had

bilateral

vertebral fracture; a

rib

multiple injuries

fractures

comminuted

with

right pubic

tiny

ramus

fracture; bilateral SI shear fracture; extensive pelvic fractures; a large contusion in

the abdominal wall with small foci of extravasation 0f the vessels in the superﬁcial
soft tissue

of the

left hip;

and a small contusion over the

right

lower quadrant

abdominal wall.

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the 752 page electronic ﬁle labeled
pdf.” A11 documents in that electronic
“Conﬁdential Documents Appeal Volume 1 6-25-19
.

ﬁle will be identiﬁed as “PSI.”

.

.

Joelle

Tanguay sustained multiple

hemorrhages

at the cerebral

rib fractures; left clavicular fracture; punctate

gray/White matter interfaces and the splenium of the

corpus callosum, effaced basal cisterns suggesting cerebral edema; right frontal and

temporal subgaleal hematoma; craniocervical dislocation and extensive soft tissue
swelling or hemorrhage in the prevertebral soft tissues 0f the upper cervical spine.

She had acute respiratory failure which required intubation and ultimately
She developed a right-sided hemothorax requiring chest tube
tracheostomy.
placement a leftsided pneumothorax requiring chest tube placement.
(PSI, p. 1 84.) In

more common

The Victims of the

terms, the presentence investigator explained:

have suffered life altering injuries from Which
they will never recover. Ellen Brown suffered a broken leg in three places, a broken
vertebra that required a metal plate, a shattered pelvis, and a mild brain injury. Ellen
can walk with the assistance of a cane, but she must use a Wheelchair if she has to
walk a long distance. She will also most likely never be able to return to work.
Joelle

instant offense

Tanguay suffered an

feeding tube. She

is

internal decapitation,

and she must use a trachea and a

unable to speak due to her vocal cords being paralyzed. She

experienced traumatic brain injury, and she has undergone multiple surgeries. She
is only able t0 sleep for short periods 0f time due t0 the amount 0f pain she suffers.
Joelle understands

what her future looks

has asked her father to

let

like,

and 0n more than one occasion, she

her die.

(PSI, p.199.)

The

state

charged Bolstad with two counts 0f aggravated DUI, obstructing a police ofﬁcer,

and possession 0f an open container 0f alcohol
plea agreement, Bolstad pled guilty to an

in a

motor vehicle.

(R., pp.42-44.)

Pursuant to a

amended charge 0f aggravated DUI, which named both

Joelle

Tanguay and Ellen Brown

as the Victims. (R., pp.53-54;2 see generally Tr., p.4, L.5

L.2 1 .) The remaining charges were dismissed. (R., pp.67-68.) The
15-year sentence, With nine years ﬁxed.

$836,723.71 in restitution. (Aug.

judgment and the

1,

Motion

The court

imposed a uniﬁed

also ordered Bolstad t0

pay

pp.137-138.3) Bolstad ﬁled timely notices 0f appeal from the

restitution order.

electronic ﬁle labeled “2nd

(R., pp.64-66.)

district court

— p.25,

t0

(R.,

Aug —

pp.75-78; Second Motion to
State V. Bolstad

— NO 47050.

Augment

(located in

pdf.”), pp.3-6.)

2

The amended charge read, in part, that Bolstad was “in actual physical control 0f a motor vehicle,
0n 0r at 1-90, While under the inﬂuence of alcohol, drugs, and/or an intoxicating substance, or in
the alternative, drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle at the above-described
location, with an alcohol concentration of .08 0r more, as shown by an analysis 0f his blood, and
did thereby cause great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disﬁgurement t0 a person
other than himself, to-wit: Joelle

According

Tanguay and Ellen Brown[.]”

(R., pp.53-54.)

Trafﬁc Collision and Reconstruction Analysis Report, neither Victim had
drugs in her system. (PSI, p.606.) Although toxicology testing of Bolstad’s

t0 the I.S.P.

ethyl alcohol or

illicit

blood did not detect any ethyl alcohol, it gave positive results for amphetamine and
methamphetamine. (Id.) A toxicology report from Kootenai Health also indicated Bolstad had

amphetamine and methamphetamine
3

in his system. (Id.)

There are several electronic ﬁles augmenting the appellate record. The two main augmented

ﬁles have typed page numbers which, although apparently attempting to do so, are not in

continuous sequence. The electronic ﬁle labeled “20200625 125421488 (etc.)” has pages

1

through

128, then skips to pages 226 through 232. Electronic ﬁle “202006251301421 18 (etc.)” contains

pages 129 through 225. The state will refer to the ﬁle ending in 1488 as “Aug. 1,” and the ﬁle
ending in 21 18 as “Aug. 2.” Page number citations of both ﬁles Will correspond to the electronic

numbering of each

ﬁle.

ISSUES
Bolstad states the issues on appeal

as:

district court abuse its discretion When it imposed a uniﬁed sentence
0f ﬁfteen years, With nine years ﬁxed, upon Mr. Bolstad following his plea
0f guilty to one count 0f aggravated DUI?

I.

Did the

II.

Did the

district court abuse its discretion When
$83 1 ,728.71 in restitution?

it

ordered Mr. Bolstad t0 pay

(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

1.

Has Bolstad

failed to

show an abuse 0f sentencing

2.

Has Bolstad

failed t0

show

pay $836,723.71 in restitution?

that the district court

discretion?

abused

its

discretion

by ordering him

to

ARGUMENT
I.

Bolstad Has Failed

A.

To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing

Discretion

Introduction

On appeal,

Bolstad argues that “given any View 0f the

years, with nine years ﬁxed,

sentence

mental

is

is

illness,

district court

methamphetamine

abused

Standard

Where
sentence

is

its

at

a sentence

is

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.)

and

Bolstad has failed to show that the

Within statutory limits, an appellant

is

required to establish that the

a clear abuse ofdiscretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001)

134 Idaho 83 1, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry

615.

A

sentence

protecting society, and any 0r

retribution.

support of family and friends, remorse,

Of Review

his sentence is excessive

38 P.3d

addiction,

his difﬁcult early childhood,

sentencing discretion.

(citing State V. Lundguist,

show

uniﬁed sentence of ﬁfteen

excessive.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) Bolstad further contends his

excessive in light of the following mitigating factors:

acceptance 0f responsibility.

B.

facts, his

under any reasonable View 0f the
is

all

facts.

this

burden, Bolstad must

Ba_lccr,

136 Idaho

at

577,

reasonable if appropriate t0 achieve the primary objective 0f

of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or

State V. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384,

whole sentence on appeal and presumes

582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The Court reviews the

that the

ﬁxed portion of

the sentence will be the

defendant’s probable term of conﬁnement. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391

(2007).

In deference to the trial judge, the Court Will not substitute

its

View 0f a reasonable

sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State V. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707,

710

(Ct.

App. 1982).

C.

The

District Court

Considered The Facts, The Relevant Law,

Decision Within The Bounds

Of Its

The maximum prison sentence
district court

guidelines.

imposed a sentence 0f 15

for aggravated

DUI

is

15 years. LC. § 18-8006(1)(a).

years, with nine years ﬁxed,

offense and the four sentencing considerations

Ls.9-22; p.95, Ls.12-17.)

A Sentencing

Discretion

Bolstad’s sentence

(R., pp.64-66.)

And Reached

is

which falls within the

— particularly the need t0 protect society.
all

four factors in

its initial

(TL, p.93,

comments, and

announced, obviously based 0n the devastating nature of Bolstad’s offense, “I think

protection 0f society,

case.

You’ve got

to

When

go

I

statutory

appropriate in light 0f the egregiousness of the

The court acknowledged

parties here, the lawyers for the State

The

and the lawyers for you know, that when

I

all

of the

think about

think about deterrence and punishment, this has t0 be a penitentiary

to prison for this

and

it

was

very, Ithink, forthright for the parties to

know

that.” (Tr., p.95, Ls.17-23.)

This

is

Bolstad’s second adult felony conviction.

arrested for Burglary

II

in

probation for that offense.

pending a Burglary

II

When

he was

he was

King County, Washington, and subsequently placed 0n unsupervised
(PSI, p.191.)

At

the time 0f his current offense, Bolstad

charge in Pierce County, Washington.

(Id.)

According

was

t0 Bolstad,

also

“he was

hearing voices, so he broke into a place t0 get away. After he was arrested, he ‘freaked out’ and

went

‘catatonic.

3”

(Id.)

In 2016, Bolstad

had misdemeanor convictions for criminal trespass and

malicious mischief, based 0n getting drunk, breaking a
building. (Id.) In sum, Bolstad has

engaged

Window

at

a mini-mart, and entering the

in criminal conduct, including

one felony, on several

occasions in the past. The LSI-R (Level of Service Inventory—Revised) evaluation rated Bolstad
as a “moderate” risk to reoffend. (PSI, p.197, 198.)

A sentencing court’s decision t0 treat a sentencing factor as mitigating or aggravating “is
a factual one.”

State V.

Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 592, 448 P.3d 1005, 1020 (2019) (quoting

State V. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789,

set aside the “consideration

clearly erroneous.

I_d.

948 P.2d 127, 144 (1997)). Accordingly,

of a factor as aggravating 0r mitigating” unless

this

Court will not

determination

is

This Court has further acknowledged that mental illness and substance

abuse can be mitigating, 0r aggravating, or both.

EQ

(“Addiction,

both a mitigating factor and aggravating factor at sentencing”);

ﬂ

720, 726, 202 P.3d 642, 648 (2008) (explaining 10W intelligence
to

this

is

by

itself,

can be either 0r

also Pizzuto V. State, 146 Idaho

a “two-edged” sword, relevant

both aggravation and mitigation).
Bolstad’s childhood appears t0 have been good, at least to the extent that he can recall

He

it.

told the presentence investigator:

was adopted

don’t

remember much before

was adopted so I’ll
start then. My life was pretty normal through my early years. Good parents, good
family, my mom and dad provided for me both love and protection. I had some
trouble in school and making friends due t0 learning disabilities and being a little
If
odd but I grew out 0f that by middle school. I started sports at an early
I would describe my youth it would be as an athlete. My middle school and high
school days were pretty normal, [I] played sports, made friends, and that’s really it.
No abuse or heavy drug use. I did try weed and beer in high school but mostly at
I

at

.

.

.

I

high school parties around
(PSI, p. 1 91 (spelling,

statements, Bolstad

years 01d.

I

but nothing out of the normal.

grammar, and punctuation modiﬁed, explanation added).) Based 0n his own

was raised by loving and protective adoptive parents from the time he was

Such a positive family dynamic during

his childhood does not mitigate his criminal

conduct. However, the current support of Bolstad’s family and friends does tend to be a mitigating

sentencing consideration, although his mother’s extraordinary efforts t0 get

he needed did not prevent him from committing his crime.

The

district court said

it

believed Bolstad

him the mental

health

(E PSI, pp.192-193.)

When he expressed remorse

for his crime,

and

the court understood that, as defense counsel explained, remorse can be difﬁcult for people like

Bolstad t0 effectively verbalize.

(T12, p.99,

Ls.18—22;

ﬂ

id.,

p.76, Ls.2-6 (apology).)

Given the

court’s ﬁrst—hand appraisal of Bolstad’s sincerity about his remorse, there

genuineness of his statement accepting

Both statements serve
According

full responsibility for his offense.

The

n0 reason

(E

to

doubt the

T12, p.76, Ls.7-9.)

as mitigating factors.

t0 the presentence investigator,

indicated his mental health issues were exacerbated

p.199.)

is

investigator rejected

any suggestion

“[a]s t0 the instant offense,

by his drug use and he was

that Bolstad’s

Mr. Bolstad

delusional.” (PSI,

drug use made him

less culpable

for his actions:

Mr. Bolstad’s mental health issues do not make him less accountable 0r responsible
for his actions. He was fully aware of the impact that methamphetamine had on his
mental health issues, but he still elected to use.
(PSI, p.199.)

Indeed, the “intersection” 0f the two dynamics most at play in Bolstad’s criminal conduct

— his mental

and methamphetamine addiction — were foremost on the

illness

district court’s

mind

In discussing the connection between mental illness and substance

in formulating his sentence.

abuse, the court explained that the “self—medication” concept,4 sometimes used t0 excuse 0r

mitigate criminal conduct, does not apply to Bolstad, stating:

Ihave not a doubt
it’s

in

my mind that you suffer from a mental illness. Now, whether

a strict diagnosis of schizophrenia, there’s a bit 0f question before the Court.

There’s been some question before other examiners, but

about

that.

You have

a serious mental illness and

it’s

Where it gets complicated is When that mental illness
abuse.

There

is

I

don’t want t0 quibble

difﬁcult to deal with.

intersects then With substance

a tendency in our culture today to use the phrase of people self-

medicating to medicate their

own

their

mental illnesses rather than professional

medical treatment.

4

The

district court

self—medicating

may have been

by using

illegal

responding t0 Bolstad’s mother’s assertion that Bolstad was

drugs t0 cope With his mental
9

illness.

(E PSI, pp.156, 192.)

Now, undoubtedly there’s

a true

component

the effects 0f illegal controlled substances

t0 that.

may

It

may be

that for individuals

feel better than the effects

0f legal

medicines that people are given t0 try to control mental illnesses. But we as a
culture must never forget that this so-called self—medication is also and nothing less
than a series of criminal
In order for

you

acts.

methamphetamine every time that you’ve used it from
of 2018, one must make a contact With a criminal dealer,

to get the

until July the 27th

one must engage in a criminal transaction, that means money for that illegal
controlled substance, and then one commits the crime of possessing and using that
controlled substance. When that happens and under this instance, I am left with
little doubt that the methamphetamine terribly exacerbated and aggravated
whatever issues were going 0n in your decision making and brain decision making
made them completely worse because 0f the methamphetamine.

.

.

.

This

is

a mental illness intersecting with criminal and repeated criminal conduct

you have committed other crimes
before When you have chosen t0 use methamphetamine for Whatever reason.
Whether it be the so-called self—medication or other reasons. You have committed
case. Ithink the prosecution rightly pointed out,

other crimes and put people at risk in the process.

And

so because 0f that,

a crime that

we do need

to sentence,

I

think, accordingly, that this

was motivated by previous criminal

acts,

and one

that has

was
had

indescribable consequences to the Victims and their families here.

(TL, p.96, L.7

— p.98,

Without

L.18.)

expressly

stating

it,

the

court

district

methamphetamine addiction/use was an aggravating

factor

reasonably

— one

of his crime. The court further explained, “so because 0f that,
accordingly, that this

was a crime

had indescribable consequences
its

that

found

that motivated the

we do need

was motivated by previous criminal

t0 the Victims

and

that

their families here.”

Bolstad’s

commission

t0 sentence,

acts,

and one

(T11, p.98,

I

that has

Ls.14-18.) In

concluding remarks, the court focused on the need t0 protect society, as follows:
This sentence

is

the best sentence that this Court can arrive at to try to achieve a

protection 0f society, to let our society

know

that aggravated driving

under the

inﬂuence or driving under the inﬂuence of this type is such a danger that only very
serious consequences ﬂow from that. Our culture needs to know that serious
consequences

ﬂow from this. And for those reasons,

(Tn, p.100, Ls.7—14.)

10

it is

a 9 plus 6 for 15.

think,

Based on the above arguments, Bolstad has

The

sentencing discretion.
Joelle Tanguay, Ellen

methamphetamine

Brown, and their families and

(a felony in itself)

—

show any abuse

in the district court’s

serious nature of Bolstad’s offense, the life-altering

validate the court’s decision.

sentencing criteria

failed t0

friends,

while aware that

it

and the

fact that Bolstad

t0

chose to use

exacerbated his mental health issues,

The sentence imposed 0n Bolstad was reasonable

especially the need t0 protect society

harms done

in light

of all four

— and should be afﬁrmed.

II.

T0 Show That The District Court Abused Its
PaV $836,723.71 In Restitution

Bolstad Has Failed

A.

Discretion

BV Ordering Him T0

Introduction

The

district court

pp.137—138.)

On

ordered Bolstad t0 pay restitution totaling $836,723.71.5

appeal, Bolstad argues that the district court “abused

exercising reason, and

by

failing t0 recognize the outer boundaries

of

its

its

(Aug.

discretion

1,

by not

discretion in failing to

consider Mr. Bolstad’s current and foreseeable ability to pay.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Bolstad

concludes that the court “should have exercised
restitution

amount 0r forgone

Bolstad’s argument

have been ordered

to

5

The

district court

it

discretion and either signiﬁcantly reduced the

restitution entirely.” (Id., p. 12.)

fails for

pay any

two reasons.

restitution, his

agreement. Second, although the
ﬁxture earning ability,

its

First, t0 the extent

argument

district court did

is

he argues that he should not

waived by the terms of

his plea

not expressly discuss Bolstad’s current and/or

implicitly, yet clearly, did so.

speciﬁcally ordered restitution as follows: $88,823.00 (Joelle Tanguay

trust),

$5,671.43 (Ellen Brown), $725,639.28 (Kaiser Permanente), $1 1,590.00 (The Hartford), and

$5,000.00 (Progressive

Ins. C0.).

Those amounts
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total

$836,723.71. (Aug.

1,

pp.137—138.)

B.

Standard

Of Review

The decision whether

to order restitution

court’s discretion. State V. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 21

and

in

296 P.3d 412, 417

1,

court’s factual ﬁndings in relation to restitution will not

evidence.

State V. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885,

Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (201

C.

What amount

be disturbed

is

committed

(Ct.

if

t0 the trial

App. 2013). The

trial

supported by substantial

292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013);

State V. Corbus, 150

1).

Waived AnV Argument That He Should Not Pay Any

Bolstad’s Plea Agreement
Restitution

Bolstad argues that the
restitution

amount 0r forgone

district

court should have “either signiﬁcantly reduced the

restitution entirely.”

(Id.,

p.12 (emphasis added).)

However,

Bolstad speciﬁcally waived his right to argue that he should not be ordered to pay any restitution

When he

entered his guilty plea, t0 Wit:

THE COURT: The pretrial settlement offer appears to call for Mr. Bolstad t0 plead
guilty t0 the charge that

is

contained in a proposed

Amended

being a count 0f aggravated driving under the inﬂuence that

0f the alleged Victims from original Counts

Mr. Bolstad

is

and Counts

would need

to

be arrived

at at

He’s agreeing

t0

I

him

pay a

stated the plea agreement t0 the State’s satisfaction?

MS. SIMMONS: Yes,

think combines both

t0

Withdraw his

restitution

a later date, but that could contain

original charges against him.

Have

I

Judge.

THE COURT: How about for the defense?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, your Honor.
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That

II.

giving up his right to ask the Court t0 allow

guilty plea prior to the sentencing date.
that

I

Information.

amount

all

0f the

THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Bolstad, d0 you understand the plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have

you had enough time With your lawyer so

that

you

feel

comfortable and ready t0 plead guilty today?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT: D0
t0

Yes, your Honor.

you need any more time with your lawyer before you’re ready

g0 forward?

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:
don’t

No, your Honor.

You’re agreeing

know how much that is

yet,

pay a restitution amount ofsome sort, but we
and that could include all 0f the original charges

t0

in that restitution amount.

D0 you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT:
(TL, p.5, L.4

Yes, your Honor.

— p.7, L.19 (emphases

added);

ﬂ

PSI, p.1.)

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are generally reviewed using contract law
State V. Taylor, 157 Idaho 369, 372,

standards.

omitted).

“As with other types 0f contracts,

336 P.3d 302, 305

(Ct.

App. 2014)

(citations

m

the interpretation 0f unambiguous terms and the legal

effect

0f the plea agreement are questions of law to be decided by the court.”

m,

138 Idaho 409, 410-411, 64 P.3d 335, 336-337

(Ct.

App. 2003)).

I_d.

(citing

Pursuant t0 the plain

language of his plea agreement, Bolstad waived, without any express or implied limitation, his
right to

pay “a restitution amount.” Therefore,

court erred

by ordering him

t0

pay any

t0 the extent Bolstad

restitution
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may be arguing that the district

amount, his argument has been waived.

The

D.

District

During the

and

legal

Court Implicitlv Considered Bolstad’s Current

And Future

restitution hearing, the district court directed the parties to

arguments in written memoranda. (Rest. Hrg.

parties did not address Bolstad’s

Rest. Hrg. Tr.) In the state’s

immediate or future

memorandum,

it

pay

make

their factual

At

that hearing, the

restitution.

(E generally

Tr., p.34, Ls.4-18.6)

ability to

Earning Ability

argued:

In this case, the State anticipates the defense Will argue the insurance

companies should not be awarded restitution due to the enormous amount of
medical bills accumulated between the Victims in this case and the defendant’s
probable future inability to pay the entire amounts requested. If so argued, the State
would respectfully disagree With this position. The defendant caused substantial
injuries to these Victims and therefore should be expected t0 bear the burden of the
enormous costs resulting directly from his actions.
(Aug.

1,

pp.126-127.)

As

anticipated,

Bolstad argued that the restitution request was

“undesirable

and

inappropriate” based on his “signiﬁcant mental illness” that “he Will battle the rest of his life,” and
the fact that he will be “incarcerated for

that his “future ability to earn

he

is

many more

income and pay

years.” (Aug. 2, p.4.) Bolstad also asserted

restitution is limited,

and largely unknown[,]” and

unlikely to have the ability, after prison, to obtain a high-paying job and have any realistic

opportunity t0 pay the nearly

arguments presented by the

and future

ability to

The

pay

1

million dollars of requested restitution.”

parties, the district court

restitution

district court’s

were

t0

was made aware

(Id.)

Based 0n the

that Bolstad’s

immediate

be considered.

Order Re: State’s Request for Restitution

stated,

“§ 19-5304(7)

provides that the amount 0f restitution t0 be ordered be based on the amount of economic loss and

6

Page

citations t0 the Restitution hearing transcript are according to the four-quadrant electronic

ﬁle labeled “47050 Restitution Hearing Multi-IX.pdf.”
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the ﬁnancial resources, needs and earning ability 0f the defendant?” (Aug.

LC.

§

1,

p.133.) Although

19-5304(7) does not distinguish between a defendant’s immediate ability t0 pay from his 0r

her future ability to pay, in State V. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661,

_, 462 P.3d 1125, 1146-1 147 (2020)

(emphasis added), the Idaho Supreme Court recently made the following ruling, relied upon in part

by Bolstad

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief, p.1

1):

”

[T]he district court did not recognize that the “immediate inability ofa defendant
”
topay is a separate conceptfrom the ‘foreseeable ability 0fthe defendant t0 repay
the award.
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by failing to
recognize the outer boundaries of

its

discretion in failing to identify the proper

standard.

showing an exercise of reason.
The district court’s analysis With respect t0 Garcia’s ability to pay consists of one
sentence: “Having considered [Garcia’s] economic circumstances, the Court
concludes that an order of restitution is appropriate in this case.” The Court of
Appeals afﬁrmed the district court in Bybee, noting that the district court had
acknowledged both the magnitude 0f the restitution and Bybee’s business acumen.
See Bybee, 115 Idaho [541, 543], 768 P.2d [804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989)]. This Court
observed that the district court in Wisdom had speciﬁcally found that Wisdom could
expect her employment situation t0 improve; this Court found that “[t]he
Further, the district court abused

its

discretion by not

presentence materials serve[d] as substantial evidence supporting that conclusion.”

Wisdom, 161 Idaho [916, 924], 393 P.3d [576, 584 (2017)]. There is n0 similar
by the district court here, even though nothing in the presentence

analysis provided

materials serves as “substantial evidence” that Garcia has any foreseeable ability t0

repay the amount of restitution awarded.
Importantly, nothing in our decision today should suggest that a district court

is

required t0 divine a defendant ’Sfutureﬁnancial capabilities, 0r that a district court
should limit a victim’s right t0 restitution t0 what is presently known about the
defendant.

7

A

defendant facing a lengthy prison sentence

may be

dramatically

Idaho Code § 19-5304(7) reads:

The

court, in determining

Whether

restitution, shall consider the

result

to order restitution

amount of economic

and the amount 0f such

loss sustained

by the Victim

0f the offense, the ﬁnancial resources, needs and earning

defendant, and such other factors as the court
inability to

pay

restitution

by a defendant

not order restitution.

(Emphasis added.)
1

5

deems

appropriate.

shall not be, in

ability

as a

of the

The immediate

and of itself, a reason

t0

more employable

diﬂerent and markedly
ofhz's crime.

However, the

district court

after his release than

he was at the time

did not address Garcia’s future ability t0

repay at all. This is a failure t0 show an exercise 0f reason, and therefore constitutes
an abuse of discretion.

The

district court

found

that,

“notwithstanding Defendant’s incarceration With the Idaho

Department 0f Corrections, evidence ofhis mental

illness,

and the large amount ofthese restitution

claims, restitution orders in this case are neither inappropriate nor undesirable[.]” (Aug.

By

stating

“notwithstanding

Defendant’s

with

incarceration

the

Idaho

Department

Corrections,” the district court separated out Bolstad’s immediate inability to pay from
will

no longer be conﬁned — signaling

its

1, p. 1

34.)

of

when he

focus on Bolstad’s future ability t0 pay. Additionally,

given that the court sentenced Bolstad t0 a ﬁxed term 0f nine years, there could not have been any

had an “immediate

serious question t0 the reality that he

period.

inability” to

pay

restitution during that

Accordingly, the only Viable issue before the court was whether Bolstad had the

“foreseeable ability” to pay restitution. In short, although the court did not expressly state as much,

it

appears that the court implicitly found that Bolstad had n0 immediate ability t0 pay, but he did

have a foreseeable

ability to pay.

(1986) (implicit ﬁndings 0f

trial

E

State V.

Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737

court should be overturned only if unsupported

State V. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641,

0f the

trial

court supported

As GLcia

states,

by

644

(Ct.

by evidence);

App. 1998) (“[A]ny implicit ﬁndings

substantial evidence should be given

due deference”).

“nothing in our decision today should suggest that a

district court is

required to divine a defendant’s future ﬁnancial capabilities, or that a district court should limit a
Victim’s right t0 restitution t0 what

lengthy prison sentence
release than he

was

the district court

at the

may

is

presently

known about the

defendant.

A defendant facing a

be dramatically different and markedly more employable

time ofhis crime.” Garcia, 166 Idaho

was not required

at

,

after his

462 P.3d at 1147. Although

to “divine” Bolstad’s “future ﬁnancial capabilities,” its implicit
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ﬁnding that Bolstad had a future
evidence.

ability to

pay on his restitution debt was supported with substantial

According to the PSI, Bolstad worked for

21/2 years, earning

base/maintenance manager for a ski and snowboard shop.
listed his

job

and experience

skills

as, “electrical,

$35,000 per year, as a

(PSI, p.195.)

plumbing, construction, maintenance, [and]

managing[,] [and] [h]e denied he has problems holding steady employment

employed

Additionally, Bolstad

for during all of the past year except for the

.

.

ﬁve months he has been

.

[and he] has been

incarcerated.” (Id.

(spelling corrected).)

Based 0n the implicit ﬁndings
restitution, but did

have a foreseeable

that Bolstad did not

ability to

pay

have an immediate

restitution,

ability to

pay

Which ﬁndings were supported

with substantial evidence, Bolstad has failed to show any abuse of the court’s discretion in

its

restitution order.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

restitution order

0f the

DATED this

Court t0 afﬁrm the

district court’s

district court.

10th day of November, 2020.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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judgment and
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I

correct
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copy of the foregoing BRIEF
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RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of

have
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this 10th

iCourt File and Serve:

SALLY J. COOLEY
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documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

JCM/dd

18

